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BRINGING DOWN THE CURTAIN ON REAR WINDOW:
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND
DERIVATIVE MOTION PICTURES
I.

INTRODUCTION

Very seldom does a feature length film begin its existence as a simple
cinematic idea or creation. Rather, the film is usually the offspring of a
pre-existing work.' Both works, the film and the pre-existing work, are
worthy and capable of copyright protection. Movies based on underlying
literary works must have the legal consent of the copyright proprietor of
the literary work. Only then can exploitation of both the literary work
and the movie exist in a peaceful and consensual manner.
But, what happens when the exploitation interests of the movie and
the literary work clash, and the owner of the copyright in the literary
work claims that his or her rights are being infringed? Whose interests
should prevail? Should the proprietor in the underlying work be allowed
to enjoin the exploitation of the derivative work?2 These questions will
be addressed in this casenote, in the context of Abend v. MCA, Inc.3
("Abend"). In Abend, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "defendants' continued exploitation of the Rear Window [Paramount Pictures 1954] film without Abend's consent violate[d] Abend's renewal
copyright in the underlying story 'It Had To Be Murder.'4
II.

FACTS

In February 1942, Dime Detective Magazine published Cornell
Woolrich's story entitled "It Had To Be Murder." 5 Popular Publications, Incorporated ("Popular Publications"), the magazine's publisher,
1. Some examples of successful movies that are based on literary works are Gone With
The Wind (Metro Goldwyn Mayer 1939), Out of Africa (Universal 1985), You Can't Take It
With You (Columbia 1938), and The Godfather (Paramount 1972).
2. The derivative work is the movie as it is based on a pre-existing work. See infra note
45 for a statutory definition of "derivative work."
3. 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988).
4. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1478. Defendants include MCA, Inc.; Universal Film Exchange,
Inc.; James Stewart; Patricia Hitchcock O'Connel and Samuel Taylor, as Co-Executors of the
Estate of Alfred Hitchcock and as Co-Trustees of the Assets of the Estate of Alfred Hitchcock.
Abend, the plaintiff, is a literary agent who owns the copyright in the underlying work, a short
story entitled "It Had To Be Murder," on which Rear Window is partially based.
5. Id. at 1467.
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held a "blanket copyright" in the magazine.6 In April, 1943, Popular
Publications assigned any rights it had in the story to Woolrich.7 Two
years later, Woolrich assigned the motion picture rights to "It Had To
Be Murder" to B. G. De Sylva Productions for $9,250.8 Woolrich also
agreed to renew the copyright in the story, and to assign De Sylva Productions the same rights for the twenty-eight year renewal term.9 MCA
acquired the movie rights to "It Had To Be Murder" from De Sylva's
successors in interest for $10,000.10
In 1954, Paramount Pictures produced and distributed the movie
version of Woolrich's story. The movie, entitled Rear Window, was directed by Alfred Hitchcock and starred Jimmy Stewart and Grace
Kelly." The movie was copyrighted by the defendants Stewart, Hitchcock and MCA, at that time. 12
Woolrich failed to renew the copyright in his story prior to his death
in 1968.13 He was without a surviving spouse or child, and left his property to a trust administered by his executor, Chase Manhattan Bank
("Chase Manhattan"). 4 In 1969, Chase Manhattan renewed the copyright in "It Had To Be Murder" pursuant to the Copyright Act of 1909,
17 U.S.C. section 24 ("section 24").11 Three years later, Chase Manhattan assigned the renewal copyright to Sheldon Abend, a literary agent,
for "$650 plus 10% of all proceeds from exploitation of the story."' 6
After Rear Window was broadcast on network television in 1971,
Abend contacted Jimmy Stewart, Alfred Hitchcock and MCA to inform
them that he owned the copyright renewal and that any rebroadcast
would infringe his copyright.' 7 Nevertheless, Stewart, Hitchcock and
MCA entered into a second agreement with the ABC television network
6. Id. The "blanket copyright" gave the publisher a copyright in everything within the

magazine.
7. Id. The assignment did not include any rights to magazine publication.

8. Id.
9. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1467.

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1483.
13. Id. at 1467.
14. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1467.
15. Id. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909 Act) provides in relevant part:
the proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the
copyright in such work for the further term of twenty-eight years when application
for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the copyright office and duly
registered therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of
copyright....
16. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1467.
17. Id.
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to rebroadcast the movie.I 8 Thereafter, Abend filed suit against Stewart,
Hitchcock and MCA alleging copyright infringement.' 9 Abend later
agreed to dismiss the complaint in exchange for $25,000.20
In 1982 Stewart, Hitchcock and MCA renewed their copyright in
Rear Window. 2 In 1983, the copyright owners of Rear Window authorized a re-release of the film, including theatre and cable showings in the
22
United States, and sales and rentals of videodiscs and videocassettes.
23
The re-release generated over $12 million in revenue.
Again, Abend brought suit against Stewart, Hitchcock and MCA,
alleging that the re-release constituted copyright infringement, and interfered with his ability to produce other derivative works based on the
24
original story.

Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 2' The defendants filed three motions for summary judgment, one based on
Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc.2 6 ("Rohauer"), one based on alleged defects in the story's copyright, and one based on a fair use defense.27 The
district court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment based
on Rohauer and the fair use defense, but denied the motion based on
defects in the story's copyright.2 8 Abend moved for summary judgment
on the copyright infringement allegations, 29 which the district court denied. Both parties appealed the denial of their motions, while Abend also
appealed the district court's grant of defendants' motion for summary
judgment based on Rohauer and the fair use defense. 3" The Ninth Circuit rejected the Rohauer decision and reversed the district court's grant
of summary judgment on that issue.3 '
18. Id.
19. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1467.
20. Id. at 1467-68.
21. Id. at 1483.
22. Id. at 1468. This re-release was authorized as a result of the Second Circuit's decision
in Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977), discussed infra notes 33-70
and accompanying text.
23. Id.
24. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1468.
25. Id.
26. 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977). See infra notes 33-70
and accompanying text for discussion of Rohauer.
27. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1468.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. This note will only discuss the issues relevant to the Ninth Circuit's treatment of
Rohauer in deciding Abend, and will not discuss the fair use defense and certain other issues
contained in Abend.
31. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1482.
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THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S REASONING IN LIGHT OF ROHAUER

The Ninth Circuit perceived that the major issue in Abend was to
reconcile the competing interests of the owner in the renewal copyright
of the underlying work with those of the owner in the derivative work.32
The Second Circuit had addressed and reconciled the same issue in
Rohauer, which the district court in Abend followed. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit had to review the Rohauer decision and either affirm or reject its
holding. In order to understand the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Abend,
one must first understand Rohauer.
A.

Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc.

' 33
In 1925, Edith Maude Hull, the author of "The Sons of the Sheik
sold the motion picture rights in her novel to Joseph H. Moskowitz. At
that time she also agreed to renew the copyright in the novel, and to
assign the motion picture rights to Moskowitz for the renewal term. 3 In
1926 The Son of the Sheik (United Artists 1926) was produced starring
Rudolph Valentino.3" The film was copyrighted in 1926, and renewed in
1954.36 Hull, however died before she could renew the copyright in the
story or assign the motion picture rights to Moskowitz for the renewal
term.3 7 As a result, Hull's daughter Cecil renewed the story's copyright,
and, in 1965 assigned to Rohauer all of her title and interest in and to the
motion picture and television rights to "The Sons of the Sheik."38 In
1961, the renewal copyright to The Son of the Sheik was sold to Killiam
Shows, Incorporated ("Killiam Shows"). 3 9 In 1966, Rohauer informed
Killiam Shows of his assignment from Cecil Hull, and advised Killiam
Shows that any showing of The Son of the Sheik would infringe his motion picture rights to "The Sons of the Sheik. ' "' When Killiam Shows
authorized a broadcast of The Son of the Sheik, Rohauer sued Killiam
Shows for copyright infringement. 4'
The district court held that Rohauer's renewal copyright in the
novel "The Sons of the Sheik" was infringed by broadcasts of The Son of
32. Id. The Second Circuit also found this to be the main issue in Rohauer.
33. E. HULL, THE SONS OF THE SHEIK (1925).
34. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 486 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 949 (1977).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 486.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 486-87.
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the Sheik 4 2 The Second Circuit reversed the district court and held that
exhibition of the previously copyrighted film did not infringe Rohauer's
renewal copyright in the novel. 3 In reaching that conclusion, the court
addressed several different issues in order to justify its conclusion.
B.

The Second Circuit's Rohauer Analysis

1. Section 7's Force and Validity Clause
First, the Second Circuit examined section 7 of the 1909 Copyright
Act" which provides copyright protection for "derivative works."'4 5 The
court began its analysis by explaining section 7's purpose:
Doubtless aware, even in those simpler days, that new versions
of copyrighted works might involve a degree of intellectual effort and expense quite as great as or considerably greater than
the contribution of the author of the underlying work, Congress provided that derivative works "shall be regarded as new
works subject to copyright under the provisions of this title."4 6
The court noted Congress' concern to keep the derivative copyright
in section 7 from "extend[ing] the duration of the copyright in the original work," thus causing injury to the public.4 7
An examination of the "force and validity" clause was necessary
because Rohauer and Killiam Shows each interpreted the clause differ42. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
43. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 494.
44. Section 7 of the 1909 Act reads:
Compilations or abridgments, adaptations, arrangements, dramatizations, translations, or other versions of works in the public domain or of copyrighted works when
produced with the consent of the proprietor of the copyright in such works, or works
republished with new matter, shall be regarded as new works subject to copyright
under the provisions of this title; but the publication of any such new works shall not
affect the force or validity of any subsisting copyright upon the matter employed or
any part thereof, or be construed to imply an exclusive right to such use of the original works, or to secure or extend copyright in such original works.
45. The 1976 Copyright Act defines a "derivative work" as
a work based upon one or more pre-existing works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole represent an
original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
46. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 487 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 489. If § 7 was allowed to extend the duration of copyrights in the underlying
work, Congress was afraid that authors of the underlying work could create or authorize derivative works every few years in order to extend their copyright for a potentially limitless time.
This would unduly advantage the author, giving him or her a monopolistic grip on the copyright and consequently disadvantage the public by denying ultimate public access.
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ently.4 s Rohauer claimed that Killiam Shows' exhibition of the film "affect[ed] the 'force' of the renewal copyright on the novel, and invaded his
exclusive motion picture rights to the novel." 4 9 In contrast, Killiam
Shows argued that "significant" force was given to the renewal copyright
because the proprietor of the renewal copyright had control over any
new works or "second generation" works based on the novel, and thus it
was not necessary to deprive the owner of the derivative copyright from
exhibiting the already created and copyrighted film."0 According to the
Second Circuit, the "force and validity" clause of section 7 was designed
to protect the author of the underlying work.5 1 Protection was achieved
by ensuring that (1) the derivative copyright did not grant exclusive
rights to use of the original work, and (2) the owner of the derivative
copyright was not allowed to take action that would impair the underlying copyright.5 2 The court traced the origin of certain language of the
clause to Mr. W. B. Hale,53 who testified at the Joint Hearings before the
House and Senate Committees on Patents in March, 1908. Mr. Hale
successfully argued that the relevant language should be changed from
''no such copyright shall affect" to "the publication of any such new
54
works shall not affect."
Mr. Hale was concerned with the situation where a compilation was
published, but for some reason not copyrighted.5 5 Under the 1909 Act,
failure to publish a work with the required copyright notice forfeited the
copyright and placed the work in the public domain.56 Mr. Hale did not
want an uncopyrighted compiled work to terminate the copyrights of the
works on which the compilation was based. Thus, Hale devised the language which reads that "the publication of any new such works shall not
affect the force and validity of any subsisting copyright upon the matter
employed or any part thereof, ....""
Based on that portion of legislative history, the Second Circuit concluded that the "force and validity" clause had no bearing on the facts at
48. Id. at 488.
49. Id.

50. Id.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 487.
Id. at 489.
Mr. Hale was a representative of the American Law Book Company.
Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 489.
Id.

56. 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 19 (1982). See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 7;02[C][1]
at 7-13 (1989) ("Works with defective notice were injected into the public domain immediately
upon publication").
57. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 487 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 7) (emphasis added).

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

1990]

hand.5 8 Rather, the issue before them was how far an author's consent to
create a derivative work extends, when the renewal term of the underlying 59copyright has been secured by a statutory successor under section
24.

2.

New Property Right vs. New Estate

After declining to analyze the cases used by Rohauer,W the Second
Circuit set forth its reasons for deciding in favor of Killiam Shows. The
first reason was based on the "new property right" theory adopted in
Edmonds v. Stern6 ("Edmonds"). Edmonds concluded that when "consent was given [to create a derivative work], a right of property sprang
into existence, not at all affected by the conveyance of any other right."62
Applying this theory in Rohauer, the Second Circuit found that the new
property right in the motion picture The Son of the Sheik, was not affected by vesting the renewal right in "The Sons of the Sheik" in Hull's
daughter.6 3 The Second Circuit reached this conclusion despite language
from previous cases holding that the proprietor of the derivative copyright was protected "only as to the 'new matter' contained in the derivative work, and that the statutory successor in the underlying work
[Hull's daughter] obtained a 'new estate' free from previous licenses.""
The Second Circuit disagreed with that language and concluded that the
copyright owner's "consent" to the creation of the derivative work gave
the owner of the derivative copyright the right to as much of the underlying work as was already embodied in the derivative work, regardless of
58. Id. at 490.
59. Id. The statutory successor is the person to whom the author's or owner's copyright
legally passes under § 24. This person is entitled to renew the copyright at the correct time
(within one year of the expiration of the original copyright term).
60. The Second Circuit dismissed the United States Supreme Court cases relied upon by
both parties, as factually inapposite because none of those cases addressed the question "of
effecting a proper reconciliation between the grant of derivative copyright in § 7 and the final
proviso of § 24 with respect to renewals of underlying copyrights." The court also dismissed
other district and appellate court cases relied on by Rohauer for similar reasons.
Regarding the precedents cited to resolve the Rohauer conflict, the Second Circuit remarked in general:
The short of the matter is that we have been cited to no case holding that the inability
of an author to carry out his promise to effect a renewal of a copyright because of his
death prior to the date for obtaining renewal terminates as a matter of copyright law
the right of a holder of a derivative copyright to continue to publish a derivative
work copyrighted before the author's death on which the copyright was thereafter
renewed. It is equally true that we have been cited to no case upholding such a right.
Id. at 491-92.
61. 248 F. 897 (2d Cir. 1918).
62. Id. at 898.
63. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 492.
64. Id.
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what happened to the original copyright.6 5 The Second Circuit seemed
willing to accept the "new estate" theory in a situation where the parties
never bargained for renewal rights. However, the court declined to do so
where the assignment "explicitly included rights to the derivative work
during the renewal term." 6 6 Thus, the Second Circuit put great stock in
the author's intent to grant rights in the renewal period.67
3.

Policy Considerations

Next, the Second Circuit decided, based on policy considerations,
that the "equities lie preponderantly in favor of the proprietor of the derivative copyright."6 8 The court reasoned that persons who create films
or operas based on underlying works "will often have made contributions
literary, musical and economic, as great as or greater than the original
author."69 The court also concluded that there was "no truly effective
way" for the derivative copyright owner to protect against the author's
death, and subsequent potential loss of rights in the renewal period.7"
Thus, based on the "new property right" theory, the original author's intent to grant motion picture rights to the defendants in the renewal period, and the policy/equity considerations, the Second Circuit
held that exhibition of The Son of the Sheik did not violate Rohauer's
renewal copyright in the underlying story. It was that holding and the
Second Circuit's accompanying analysis that greeted the Ninth Circuit in
Abend.
C. The Ninth Circuit's Analysis
In deciding whether Killiam Shows was entitled to summary judgment based on Rohauer, the Ninth Circuit recognized two things:
(1) that resolving the controversy required reconciling two competing interests, namely, those of the owner of the renewal copyright in the underlying literary work, and those of the owner of the renewal copyright in
the movie; and (2) that the Second Circuit in Rohauer had already addressed this problem. 7 After setting forth the relevant sections of the
1909 Copyright Act dealing with the two competing interests,7 2 the court
65. Id.
66. Id. at 491.
67. In the court's mind, the lack of intent in other cases distinguished them from this case.
Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 1491.
68. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 493.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1472-73.
72. See supra notes 17 and 45 for the text of 17 U.S.C. §§ 7, 24 (1909).
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turned its attention to the Rohauer decision.
First, the Ninth Circuit examined the Second Circuit's adherence to
the "new property right" theory.73 Abend argued that this theory violated the "traditional rule" from Russell v. Price7 4 ("Russell"), which
states that "a derivative copyright protects only the new material contained in the derivative work, not the matter derived from the underlying
work."" The Ninth Circuit agreed with Abend's argument 76 and supported the traditional rule by discussing cases in which the Second Circuit contradicted itself by adopting the traditional rule. 7 The court
found that the Second Circuit had affirmed the traditional rule in Gilliam
v. American BroadcastingCo. 78 ("Gilliam"), declaring that ownership of
the derivative copyright does not include the right to affect the scope or
ownership of the copyright in the underlying story.7 9
Next, the Ninth Circuit examined another Second Circuit case, G.
Ricordi & Co. v. ParamountPictures, Inc.8o ("Ricordi"), which held that
a "copyright renewal creates a new estate.., clear of all rights, interests
or licenses granted under the original copyright."'" In Rohauer, the Second Circuit distinguished Ricordi by pointing out that it did not involve a
situation where the author intended to extend the derivative rights be73. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1473.
74. 612 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980). See infra note 98 and
accompanying text for Russell facts.
75. Id. at 1128.
76. Judge Thompson dissented however, and found that "[t]he import of the 'traditional
rule' is simply that a derivative work's loss of its copyright protection does not cause the loss of
the underlying work's copyright protection." Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1485 (9th
Cir. 1988) (Thompson, J., dissenting).
77. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1473.
78. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). Gilliam involved certain television programs created for
the British Broadcasting Corporation ("BBC") by a group of writers and performers known as
"Monty Python." The scriptwriters agreement between the BBC and Monty Python contained detailed procedures regarding script alterations prior to recording, and gave the BBC no
power or authority to alter a program once it had been recorded. Id. at 17. After acquiring
the distribution rights to some of the Monty Python programs from the BBC, Time-Life Films
edited and broadcast three of the shows on the ABC Television network in 1975. Id at 17-18.
The Monty Python group was appalled at the editing done by Time-Life, and brought suit to
enjoin a further broadcast of similarly edited programs. Id. The Second Circuit granted the
injunction, finding that ABC had no contractual right to edit the recorded programs, and that
such editing would infringe the copyright in the underlying scripts. Id. at 17, 20-21. In dicta,
the Second Circuit stated that the copyright in the derivative work would not affect the scope
-or ownership of the copyright in the underlying script. Id. at 20.
79. Id. at 20-21. The Ninth Circuit incorrectly stated that Gilliam was decided after
Rohauer. Rohauer does not mention Gilliam in its opinion.
80. 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951). See infra notes 125-37
and accompanying text for Ricordi facts.
81. Id. at 471.
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yond the original copyright term. 2 On this point, the Ninth Circuit recognized that in both Rohauer and Abend the "authors clearly agreed to
assign the motion picture rights to the owners of the derivative work
during the renewal term." 3 However, the Ninth Circuit relied on Miller
Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc. 4 ("Miller Music"), in finding
that the mere intent to assign was unconvincing. The Ninth Circuit concluded that despite the existence of intent, there had been no effective
85
grant of rights to make a derivative work during the renewal term.
While the Second Circuit found intent to grant renewal rights a distinguishing factor, the Ninth Circuit found such intent unconvincing and
ineffective as an actual grant of motion picture rights. The court also
cited the legislative history of section 24 to support the holding of Miller
Music, and the proposition that renewal rights are contingent on the au86
thor making the renewal at the appropriate statutory time.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's "new property
right" theory in favor of the "traditional rule," and found that Woolrich's intent to grant renewal rights in the movie never vested in defendants, since Woolrich did not live long enough to renew. 7 Next, the
Ninth Circuit turned to what it considered to be Rohauer's ultimate con82. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 491.
83. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1474-75.
84. 362 U.S. 373 (1960). In Miller Music, Ben Black and Charles Daniels composed the
song "Moonlight and Roses" and assigned it to Villa Moret, Incorporated, which secured the
original copyright. Id. Prior to the expiration of the original term, Black assigned to Miller
Music his renewal rights, for royalties and $1,000. Id. at 373-74. Black's next of kin were
three brothers, each of whom executed a similar assignment and delivered them to Miller
Music. Id. Black died before the expiration of the original twenty-eight year term. Absent a
specific bequest in the will concerning the renewal copyright, one of the brothers, acting as
executor, renewed the copyright for the renewal term. Id. The probate court awarded the
renewal copyright to Black's residuary legatees, who assigned the copyright to Charles N.
Daniels, Inc. Id. Miller Music then sued Charles N. Daniels, Inc. for copyright infringement.
Id. at 373. The Court, in a 5-4 decision, found for Charles N. Daniels, Inc., and held that
assignments of renewal rights made in the original term do not vest in the assignee if the
assignor dies prior to the statutory time for making the renewal. Id. at 377-78. Rather, renewal rights pass to the statutory successors pursuant to § 24. Id.
The dissent vehemently argued against the result achieved by the majority, stating that
such a result was never intended by the Copyright Act, and impinged "on the very interests
which the Copyright Act was designed to protect." Id. at 383.
85. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1475.
86. Mr. W. B. Hale testified in a hearing before the Committee on Patents:
[I]t is only possible to cover the right of renewal of the actual author. The right of
renewal is contingent. It does not vest until the end. If he is alive at the time of
renewal, then the original contract may pass, but his widow or children or other
persons entitled would not be bound by that contract.
Id. at 1476.
87. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1472, 1475.

1990]

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

siderations: policy and equity."
While the Ninth Circuit agreed with Rohauer's equity argument
that derivative works often contain "contributions literary, musical and
economic, as great as or greater than the original author," 9 it reasoned
that the theory could also work in the reverse. In short, the court concluded that many derivative works involve only minimal contributions
and thus should not be afforded the same protections and considerations
as those works which contain substantial contributions. 90
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Rohauer's second equity argument
concerning the "inability of the purchaser of the derivative copyright 'to
protect himself against the eventuality of the author's death before the
renewal period.' "91 Again, the court relied on the Miller Music rule that
assignees of copyright renewal rights have sufficient notice that they are
acquiring only a contingent interest, which might not vest. 92
Next, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Second Circuit's focus on
the potential unfairness to owners of derivative works rather than the
policies behind section 24 that favor the author.93 The court focused on
the purpose of a section 24 renewal: to give the author a "second
chance" to make a better deal, and to protect the author's family from
losing the renewal rights.9 4 The Ninth Circuit cited Rohauer's failure to
consider the concerns embodied in section 24, and disagreed with the
Second Circuit's reliance on Congress' intent regarding the 1976 Act in
interpreting the 1909 Act. 95
While the Second Circuit viewed certain provisions of the 1976 Act
as evidencing Congress' intent to give "special protection" to derivative
works, 96 the Ninth Circuit found otherwise. The court stated that
"[w]hen Congress enacted the 1976 Act, the prevailing view was that the
owners of the renewal copyright in the underlying story could veto the
continued use of the derivative work." 97 The Ninth Circuit presumed
88. Id.at 1476.
89. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 493.
90. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1477.
91. Id.(quoting Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 493 (2d Cir. 1977)).
92. Id.(quoting Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 375 (1960)).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1478.
96. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 494. The 1976 Act does not allow termination by the author of
grants or licenses for existing derivative works which the author had granted twenty-eight year
renewal rights to. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A) (1982). The Second Circuit viewed this exception
as Congress' intent to give "special protection" to derivative works. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1478.
97. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1478 (quoting Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 183
(1985), (White, J., dissenting)).
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that Congress 9knew
of this view when it enacted the 1976 Act and chose
8
not to alter it.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that continued exploitation of Rear
Window violated Abend's renewal copyright in the underlying story. 99
However, although the equities did not dictate a holding in favor of the
derivative work, the equities argument did influence the Ninth Circuit's
remedy. Here, the court recognized the "substantial money, effort, and
talent" that went into Rear Window and acknowledged that its success
both "initially and upon re-release [was] attributable in significant measure to, inter alia, the outstanding performances of its stars-Grace
Kelly and James Stewart-and the brilliant directing of Alfred
Hitchcock.""°
The Ninth Circuit recommended that the lower court on remand
not enjoin the defendants from exploiting Rear Window. ' An injunction would injure the defendants, causing a "great injustice" based on
their significant contributions, and would foreclose "legitimate profits."' °2 Also, the court concluded that enjoining further exploitation of
Rear Window "could cause public injury by denying the public the opportunity to view a classic film for many years to come."' 3 Instead, the
court found monetary compensation to be the appropriate remedy, holding that Abend should be paid actual damages suffered as well as the
profit attributable to the infringement." °
IV.

THE EXISTING STATE OF THE LAW

A.

Case Law

The first case to address the potential conflict between underlying
and derivative works was Edmonds v. Stern. 105 There the Second Circuit
held that a new property right sprang into existence upon the creation of
an authorized derivative work. 0 6 Furthermore, that property right was
unaffected by the conveyance of any other right.17 In Edmonds, Shepard Edmonds composed the music and lyrics of a song, which he sold to
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Abend, 863 F.2d at 1479.
Id.
Id. at 1479-80.
248 F. 897 (2d Cir. 1918).
Id. at 898.
Id.
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Stem and other defendants."18 Stern copyrighted the song in 1903 under
a royalty agreement. 1 Thereafter, Edmonds authorized Stern to use the
song as part of an operetta, and to copyright an orchestral medley of all
the music of the operetta, including Edmond's song. "0 In 1907, defendants assigned the copyright in the song to Edmonds."' A few years
later, persons employed by Edmonds bought from Stern some copies of
the orchestral medley.' 1 2 Edmonds sued defendants, claiming that the
sale of the orchestral medley infringed the copyright in his song." 13
In finding no copyright infringement, the court recognized that defendants had a lawful copyright in the orchestral medley." 4 The court
further found that the song, and the operatic score which contained the
song, were "legally separate, and independent of each other."" ' 5 The
Second Circuit did not care that the separate and independent existence
grew out of Edmond's consent to allow his song to be part of the operetta. 1 6 Rather, the court held that "[w]hen that consent was given, a
right of property sprang into existence, not at all affected by the conveyance of any other right." 1 7 Thus, the "new property right" theory was
penned.
The next case to deal with this topic was Fitch v. Shubert118
("Fitch"), which adopted a slightly different theory. In Fitch, Clyde
Fitch wrote a play called "Barbara Frietchie, the Frederick Girl," which
was copyrighted in 1900.1"9 Upon his death, the interest in the initial
term of the copyright passed to his mother, and then to the Actors Fund
of America. 12 1 In 1925, the Actors Fund granted a license to the
Shuberts to produce a musical version of the play entitled "My Maryland.' 12 1 In 1927, Clyde's cousin, Richard, the statutory successor in the
renewal copyright, renewed the copyright in the play.' 2 2 When the
Shuberts mounted a production of the play in 1937, Richard sued for
108. Id. at 897.
109. Id.
110. Edmonds, 248 F. at 897.

111. Id.
112. Id.

113. Id.
114. Id. at 898.
115. Edmonds, 248 F. at 898.

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 20 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
119. Id.
120. These facts are from Judge Friendly's Rohauer opinion where he discusses the Fitch

case. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc. 551 F.2d 484, 490 (2d Cir. 1977).
121. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 490.
122. Fitch, 20 F. Supp. at 315.
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copyright infringement. 123 The court held that the Shuberts had acquired a license from Fitch through direct dealing with him in the renewal term. 124 Additionally, the court in dictum said:
it is clear that the plaintiff acquired a new and independent
right in the copyright, free and clear of any rights, interests, or
licenses attached to the copyright for the initial term ....

It is

evident therefore that all rights which the defendants acquired
in 1925 to use the Fitch play as the basis of a musical operetta
expired when the copyright for the original term expired in
1928 and when a new grantee
appeared as owner of the Fitch
125
play for the renewal term.

The next significant case on this issue, G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures,126 relied on the Fitch dicta in framing its holding. In
Ricordi, author John Long wrote a novel entitled "Madame Butterfly.' 1 2 7 With Long's consent, Belasco wrote a play based on the novel,
and copyrighted it in 1917.128 In 1901, Long and Belasco gave Ricordi
the exclusive rights to make an opera, based on the play. 129 Ricordi
copyrighted the play in 1904 and later renewed it. 130 Long renewed his
novel's copyright in 1925, and in 1932 granted Paramount the motion
picture rights in the novel. 131 At the same time, Paramount acquired an
assignment of the motion picture rights in Belasco's play. 132 Belasco had
133
never renewed the play's copyright.
Thus, Ricordi owned the copyright in the opera, and Paramount
held the motion picture rights in the novel and the play. Ricordi sued for
a declaration that he was entitled to make a movie version of the opera.' 3 4 Paramount argued that Ricordi had to obtain Paramount's consent for the use of the Long novel and the Belasco play.' 3 5 Paramount
argued that the expiration and renewal of the copyrights in the novel and
play terminated Ricordi's exclusive license to use the novel or play for a
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 315 (citation omitted).
189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1951).
Id. at 470. J. LONG, MADAME
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ricordi, 189 F.2d at 472.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 472.
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(1904).
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motion picture version of the opera." a6
The Second Circuit agreed with Paramount, and held that Ricordi
had received no rights under Long's renewal in the novel.' 3 7 Thus, Ricordi could not use the novel to make a motion picture version of Long's
story. The Second Circuit stated that Ricordi's interest extended only to
'
"what was copyrightable as new matter in its operatic version." 138
The
court reiterated the dictum from Fitch in holding that "[a] copyright renewal creates a new estate . . . clear of all rights, interests or licenses
granted under the original copyright." 1'39
These two theories, the "new property right" and the "new estate"
theory, were before the Second Circuit in Rohauer. As discussed herein,
the court chose the "new property right" theory advanced in Edmonds. l In 1979, the Ninth Circuit was asked to apply Rohauer in a
copyright infringement case, Russell v. Price.141
In Russell, defendant Budget Films distributed copies of the 1938
film Pygmalion (Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 1938), believing it to be in the
public domain. 4 2 Defendants were sued by Janus Films, which was licensed by the copyright proprietors in the George Bernard Shaw play
"Pygmalion" (on which the film is based) to be the exclusive distributor
of the film. 14 3 In declining defendants' request to follow the Rohauer
rule the court pointed out the significant factual differences between
Rohauer and Russell.
First, unlike Rohauer, the defendants in Russell never bargained
with the author of the original work and had no relationship with anyone
136. Ricordi, 189 F.2d at 472.
137. Id. at 471.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. The United States Supreme Court denied Rohauer's petition for certiorari, 431 U.S.
949 (1977). In Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985), a case involving the division
of royalties and the derivative works exception of § 304 of the 1976 Act, four dissenting Justices of the Court had this to say about the underlying/derivative works conflict:
Ricordi merely held that the licensee of a copyright holder may not prepare a new
derivative work based upon the copyrighted work after termination of the grant.
Some courts and commentators, however, extracted from Ricordi a rule that even
continued utilization of a previously created derivative work must cease after termination of the grant in the underlying work. (citations omitted). A narrower interpretation eventually prevailed, but not until after passage of the 1976 Act. See Rohauer
v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977)
(emphasis added). Id. at 183 n.7.
This statement was not contradicted by the majority in Mills Music and indicates the Supreme
Court's view on this issue. It certainly indicates where the four dissenting Justices stand.
141. 612 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1979).
142. Id. at 1124.
143. Id. at 1125.
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that had so bargained.'" Second, the defendants in Russell had contributed nothing to the derivative work, and unlike the defendants in
Rohauer, were not entitled to any "sympathy" which might properly be
accorded to creators of derivative works. 45 After distinguishing
Rohauer, the Russell court simply applied the "well-established doctrine
that a derivative copyright protects only the new material contained in
the derivative work, not the matter derived from the underlying
work."' 14 6 The court also held:
[t]he established doctrine prevents unauthorized copying or
other infringing use of the underlying work or any part of that
work contained in the derivative product so long as the underlying work itself remains copyrighted. Therefore, since exhibition of the film Pygmalion necessarily involves exhibition of
parts of Shaw's play, which is still copyrighted, plaintiffs here
may prevent defendants from renting the film for exhibition
147
without their authorization.
In Russell, the Ninth Circuit implied its dislike for the Second Circuit's Rohauer decision.' 4 8 Not surprisingly, when the Ninth Circuit
faced facts similar to Rohauer in Abend, '9 the court rejected Rohauer,
and instead used the theories stated in Ricordi and Russell.
B.

Commentators' Views

Much like the cases, the commentators are divided on the conflict
between underlying and derivative works. The leading copyright commentator, the late Professor Melville B. Nimmer, sides with the Ninth
Circuit's Abend decision.150 He disagrees with the "new property right"
theory in that (1) it is not warranted by an express provision of the Copyright Act and (2) it is "contrary to the axiomatic copyright principle that
a person may exploit only such copyrighted literary material as he either
owns or is licensed to use."''
Nimmer also stated that the theory was
144. Id. at 1127.
145. Id.
146. Russell, 612 F.2d at 1128 (citing 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.04
(1979)). The 1989 edition of NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT cites Russell v. Price for the traditional
rule. Thus, Russell cited NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT for the rule, and now NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT cites Russell for the rule. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.04 at 3-16

(1989).
147. Russell, 612 F.2d at 1123.
148. See, Russell, 612 F.2d at 1126 n.10, 1127 nn.12-13.
149. 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988).
150. The Ninth Circuit sides with Nimmer on this issue, and cites Nimmer in support of
several of its arguments.
151. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.07[A] at 3-23, 24 (1989).
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repudiated by Ricordi and Gilliam, but revived by Rohauer.152
Nimmer disagreed with Rohauer's "force and validity" analysis,
stating that the Second Circuit "cavalierly dispose[d] of this clause by
relying upon a Senate Committee colloquy."15' 3 Seemingly, Nimmer
would give the underlying work enough "force" to prohibit the derivative work copyright owner from making any new works, and from further exploitation of the already created derivative work.' 5 4
Nimmer also disagreed with the degree of importance the Second
Circuit placed on the underlying author's intent to grant rights in the
renewal period. 15- Nimmer obviously preferred the Ninth Circuit's reliance on Miller Music ("assignees of renewal rights take the risk that the
rights acquired may never vest in their assignors").
Regarding Rohauer's equity analysis, Nimmer was concerned that
the Rohauer rule would benefit the derivative work in inequitable situations; namely, where the derivative work contained merely slight alterations of an underlying work.' 56 In short, Nimmer would reject Rohauer
and embrace the Abend court's holding which favors the underlying
work.
Barbara Ringer, former Register of Copyrights, came to the "tentative"' 57 conclusion in her 1960 study for the Senate Judiciary Committee
entitled "Renewal of Copyright" (Study No. 31) that:
It would seem, on the basis of judicial authority, legislative history, and the opinions of the commentators, that someone cannot avoid his obligations to the owner of a renewal copyright
merely because he created and copyrighted a "new version"
under a license or assignment which terminated at the end of
the first term. 158
Still, other commentators lend support to the Second Circuit's
Rohauer position. In 1964, Professor Donald Engel wrote:
The cases indicate that the proprietor of the copyright in an
authorized new work who no longer has authorization to use
the underlying work may continue to use the new work in sub152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id. Nimmer was referring to Mr. Hale's comments.
Id.
Id.

156. 1 M.

NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

§ 3.07[A] at 3-30 (1989).

157. Rohauer used the word "tentative" presumably to describe Ringer's language "[i]t
would seem ..
" Ringer based her conclusion on Ricordi and similar earlier cases. Rohauer
v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 492 (2d Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
158. "Renewal of Copyright" (Study No. 31), reprinted in I Studies on Copyright, 503

(1963).
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stantially identical form but may not create a new version of
the new work which also constitutes a new version of the underlying work. 59
Along that same line of reasoning, Engel read the Ricordi case as follows:
[the] "Madame Butterfly" case did not hold that the proprietor
of the copyright in the new work was precluded from making
copies of or permitting public performances of the opera, but
merely held that he could not make general use of the protected
underlying material for the creation of a motion picture, itself a
new work based upon the underlying copyright which he no
longer had authorization to use.1 6 0

That reading of Ricordi was utilized by the Rohauer court in distinguishing Ricordi and allowing continued exploitation of the derivative work.
A comprehensive article in support of the "new property right" theory was written by Professor Peter Jaszi.16 1 He argued that Nimmer's
rule favoring the underlying work 162 was at odds with cases that supported the "new property right" theory. 163 He also felt that Nimmer's
position was capable of "producing undesirable results when applied to
contemporary problems in motion picture distribution."''" Jaszi advocates the "interest-balancing" approach used in Rohauer, at least where
derivative motion pictures are concerned.' 6 5 Only then does he think
that the public interests will be met which the copyright system was
designed to promote. 166 When copyright law is interpreted to limit public access to copyrighted works, Jaszi asserts that such limitation threatens the very foundations of copyright law as a bargain between the artist
and the public.
Another article, written by Richard Colby, 167 also argued in support
159. Engel, 12 BULL. OF THE COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 83, 119-20 & n.126 (1964).
160. Id.
161. See Jaszi, When Works Collide: Derivative Motion Pictures, Underlying Rights, and the
Public Interest, 28 UCLA L. REV. 715 (1981) [hereinafter Jaszi]. Jaszi is a professor at Washington College of Law, American University, Washington, D.C., and represented the appellants in Rohauer.
162. See Jaszi, supra note 161, at 749. Jaszi's article refers to Nimmer's rule as "derivative
subordination."
163. Jaszi, supra note 161, at 749.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Richard Colby was an adjunct professor at Pepperdine University School of Law, and
served on numerous copyright committees, including having served as Chairman of the Copyright Committee of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.
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of Rohauer.168 Colby argued that the statutory successor to the original
work, and the copyright owner in the derivative work can both enjoy
significant use of their respective copyrights.16 9 The statutory successor
has the exclusive right to create new motion pictures (e.g., remakes and
sequels), while the derivative copyright owner has the right to continue
exploiting the derivative motion picture already created in the original
1 70
term.
Colby noted that Gilliam could not have repudiated Rohauer, because Rohauer was decided after Gilliam.'7' Colby found the key to the
cases on this issue to be the "author'sconsent-given in Rohauer and in
the 'Rear Window' litigation to include the renewal term, not given in
Fitch, Ricordi ... or Gilliam.,,1 72 Colby found, as did the Second Circuit, that the author's intent should weigh heavily in favor of allowing
1 73
the derivative work to enjoy continued exploitation.
In summation, the law as it exists on this issue is not well settled,
and the Abend and Rohauer cases represent new factual situations which
the law has struggled to address. The "new property right" theory and
its supporters argue that the derivative work should be allowed to continue being exploited. The "new estate" and "new matter" theories and
their supporters argue that the underlying copyright should be given deference, and that the derivative work should not be exploited.
V.

ANALYSIS:

A

MODERN ANALYSIS OF THE UNDERLYING/

DERIVATIVE CONFLICT REQUIRES THAT EQUITY/POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS BE GIVEN SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT

The Ninth Circuit recognized the importance and value of equity
considerations, but applied them too late in its opinion. The court downplayed and dismissed equity concerns in forming its holding, and instead
emphasized them in creating a remedy. In effect, the Ninth Circuit
forced the defendants to buy the right to continue exploiting the copyrighted derivative work, and forced the plaintiff to sell such right. While
holding that such exploitation infringed Abend's renewal copyright in
the underlying short story, the court realized the potential injury to the
creators and the public if the film was enjoined from exploitation alto168. Colby, Rohauer Revisited: "Rear Window, " Copyright Revisions, Renewals, Terminations, Derivative Works and Fair Use, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 569 (1986) [hereinafter Colby].
169. Colby, supra note 168, at 582.
170. Id. at 582-83.
171. Id. at 591.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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gether. Thus, while the Second Circuit in Rohauer, under facts essentially identical to Abend, relied on equity considerations in holding that
exploitation of the derivative work did not infringe the underlying copyright, the Ninth Circuit used equity arguments to salvage a holding
which proclaims otherwise. This about face by the Ninth Circuit actually gives credence to the significance of the equity arguments which led
to the Second Circuit holding.
The movies in both Abend and Rohauer can now enjoy continued
exploitation. However, Rear Window must buy the "privilege" of copyright infringement, while The Son of the Sheik can enjoy exploitation far
from the shadow of copyright infringement. As mentioned above, both
cases involved essentially the same factual scenario. Unfortunately, the
Ninth Circuit chose not to follow the Second Circuit's holding in
Rohauer.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the "new property right" theory in favor
of the "new estate" and "new matter" theories. In doing so, it protected
the "new matter" in Rear Window, 174 but disagreed with exploitation of
the film because it contained "old matter" from the underlying work.
Presumably then, the defendants could take their protected "new matter" and license its use for a new creation. 75 However, Stewart and
Hitchcock could not exhibit the film, because doing so would include the
exhibition of some of the original work-the short story.
Under Abend, while defendants can license the "new matter" for use
in the creation of another work, they may not use the "new matter" as it
exists, intertwined with the old matter from the underlying short story.
Realistically, this presents a problem. It is unlikely that the "new matter" will be separated out and licensed for someone else's use for the
same reason that the film cannot be shown without some of the original
work being exhibited. It is nearly impossible, in a medium such as motion pictures, to separate "new matter" from "old, underlying matter."' 76 Protecting only the "new matter" in the case of a derivative
motion picture effectively denies the derivative copyright owner of any
use or benefits of his creative and substantial effort. Unless, of course,
the derivative copyright owner can purchase from the renewal copyright
174. Alfred Hitchcock approximated that the movie borrowed 20% of the underlying story.
Brief for Petitioner at 29, n.39, Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1989) (No. 88-2102).
175. Or is this what is considered a "second generation" work? If so, and if second generation works are forbidden, then under Abend, what are Stewart and Hitchcock left with? Apparently nothing. Recognizing this glaring shortcoming, the Ninth Circuit had to backtrack
on its reasoning and its holding, and allow continued exploitation of the film.
176. See Jaszi, supra note 161, at 738.
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owner the right to exploit the derivative motion picture. Such is the answer of the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit has created a market for agents like Abend to
purchase renewal copyrights and extract money from derivative copyright owners for exploiting their creations. This scenario is acceptable
where no agreement exists with the original author for rights in the renewal period. However, where the original author intended to grant
rights in the renewal term, 177 an approach like that of the Ninth Circuit
gives an inequitable result. Furthermore, Abend brought suit to enjoin
exploitation of Rear Window because doing so hurt his ability to create
new adaptations based on the original story. The result in Abend does
nothing for him in this regard. First, the "new matter" in Rear Window
is protected, and Abend would have to be very careful not to infringe on
that "new matter." Second, removing Rear Window from circulation
neither improves nor impacts on the chances of success for Abend's new
adaptation. His work will still have to pass public muster with the original Jimmy Stewart/Grace Kelly version. Finally, paying Abend for the
infringement of his copyright does not contribute to his ability to make
an adaptation of the original story. Under Abend, Rear Window is still
being shown, and Abend did not get what he sued for in the first place.
Unless, of course, monetary compensation was really Abend's goal initially. Certainly, it is a viable goal now.
Throughout its opinion the Ninth Circuit explains why Rear Window should not continue to be exploited. In the end, the court strongly
recommended that Rear Window should be allowed to be exploited. If
the Ninth Circuit had been true to its arguments and holding, it would
not have created the "forced sale" remedy. Abend's copyright is still
being infringed, only now he is being paid to "suffer." The Ninth Circuit
concluded that equity considerations were the prime motivating factor in
the Second Circuit's Rohauer decision. In Abend, the Ninth Circuit shot
down those equity arguments in rejecting Rohauer. Yet, the Ninth Circuit embraced those same equity arguments in creating an "equitable"
remedy. The Ninth Circuit's remedy rationale should have gone into its
holding, as was done in Rohauer.
Rohauer gives the plaintiff freedom to make new adaptations based
on the original work, and to keep others from doing likewise. At the
same time, the owners of the derivative motion picture are free to exploit
their already created and copyrighted work, pursuant to the intent and
177. Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960), should be distinguished on its facts as it did not involve the underlying/derivative conflict, and should not be
adhered to in this context in order to achieve a more equitable and sensible result.
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agreement of the original work's author. This seems to be the just and
equitable answer for the underlying/derivative work conflict, where the
derivative work is a motion picture.
VI.

THE EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF A BEND

The effect of Abend is simple: derivative works in situations similar
to Rear Window or The Son of the Sheik will be removed from distribution unless the derivative copyright owners reach agreement with the
owners of the copyright in the underlying work. If an agreement is not
achieved, the derivative film will probably be shown anyway, and the
underlying copyright owner will have to file suit to determine the amount
of damages due him or her. Certainly the possibility exists that the public will lose access to some films. Ironically, this is one result the Ninth
Circuit wanted to avoid. The Second Circuit's holding in Rohauer preserves public access and the respective rights of the copyright
proprietors.
Equipped with the Abend decision, literary agents may well seek out
Abend/Rohauer situations in order to cash in on the Ninth Circuit's judicially imposed sale.' 7 8 Surely this will do little to keep certain motion
pictures available to the public. Defendants' counsel has determined
that, under Abend, a derivative work based on a work first copyrighted in
1977 could be kept off the market for the period of the first work's fortyseven year renewal term from the years 2005-2052 if the author dies
before renewal." 9 Thus, artists may decline to incorporate pre-1978
works into derivative works for fear that the right to continued use might
be suspended. Certainly, one of the aims of copyright law was to encourage creative effort and activity. The Abend decision does just the
opposite.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In 1977 the Second Circuit in Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., was
faced with a case of first impression. Judge Friendly, described by Nim178. Indeed, Abend has determined that over 600 underlying work/derivative work conflicts exist similar to those in Abend. Abend himself owns, or has purchased for others, over
100 underlying works. Brief for Petitioner at 22, n.28, Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465
(9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1989) (No. 88-2102). Rohauer
owned renewals in at least 200 films. Id. The Los Angeles Daily Journal reported that
Abend's counsel estimated that between 500 and 1,000 copyright infringement claims might
surface as a result of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Abend. Vogeler, 9th Circuit Revives Author's Copyright To 'Rear Window,' L.A. Daily J., Dec. 28, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
179. Brief for Petitioner at 22, n.29, Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1989) (No. 88-2102).
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mer as "one of the nation's outstanding copyright judges,"180 wrote for
the court without dissent. The Second Circuit held that continued exploitation of a previously created and copyrighted motion picture, whose
creation was authorized by the underlying work's author, and where the
same author explicitly intended to grant motion picture rights in the renewal term, did not infringe the renewal copyright in the underlying
work. In 1988, the Ninth Circuit faced facts essentially identical to those
in Rohauer. Nonetheless, in a 2-1 decision,' 8' the court held that exploitation of the film Rear Window did infringe the renewal copyright in
the underlying work. However, backpedaling on its own arguments and
the rationale of its holding, the court found that the film should continue
to be exploited for equity reasons. Thus, the Ninth Circuit designed a
remedy wherein the derivative copyright owner had to pay the underlying copyright owner an undetermined percentage of the profits earned
from distributing the film.
The effect of the Ninth Circuit's holding is inequitable, and will
serve to hinder public access to certain motion pictures, and will inhibit
the creative process. In contrast, the Second Circuit's Rohauer decision
allows both underlying and derivative copyright holders to enjoy significant protection, enjoyment, and exploitation of their respective copyrights, without denying public access or inhibiting creative effort. While
case law and commentators alike are split in this area of the law, certainly the better view, based on equity and policy considerations is that of
the Second Circuit. The holding in Rohauer should be adhered to in the
future, and Abend should be overturned.1 82 Only then can the purposes
180. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 3.07[A] at 3-31 (1989).
181. (Thompson, J., dissenting). One of the judges in the majority was a district court judge
sitting by designation. Computer research revealed no cases he had heard involving copyright.
182. Judge Thompson, in his dissent, argues in favor of adhering to the holding in Rohauer.
He found that Rohauer was decided on a "precedent-free slate," and that Judge Friendly and
the Second Circuit reached the correct conclusion, based on the 1909 Act, its legislative history, and policy considerations. Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1486 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Thompson, J., dissenting). Thompson concluded that Rohauer did not "deny authors of underlying works or their successors a 'second chance' to reap benefits from their own works."
Id. at 1487. Rather, under the Rohauer rule, Abend would be free to "republish 'It Had To Be
Murder,' authorize a new movie, television or theatrical productions, create book cassettes and
otherwise capitalize on the success of Rear Window in any manner so long as he does not
infringe upon the new matter contained in that movie." Id.
As to the majority's remedy, Thompson stated:
This 'share-the-wealth' concept offends my sense of justice. I don't see why Abend
should be permitted to squeeze the defendants for money generated by a movie which
they created, in which they risked their capital, and to which they committed their
substantial talents. Granted, the defendants used Woolrich's story. But they paid
him for it, and he agreed to assign his renewal rights in the story to them.
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and theories underlying copyright law be met.
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